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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has
managed to improve its image as a new global power
through the transformation of its foreign policy. China
has expanded its influence in various fields, including se-
curity, political, economic, and cultural realms. This stands
in contrast to Mao Zedong’s isolated foreign policy from
outer influence. Mao’s skeptical attitude against interna-
tional system can be traced through various events, espe-
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Abstrak
Tulisan ini berusaha memahami politik luar negeri China kontemporer dengan menilai kepemimpinannya di Bank Investasi Infrastruktur Asia
(AIIB), menggunakan konsep kontestasi multilateralisme yang diajukan oleh Julia Morse dan Robert Keohane. Penulis berargumen bahwa
sejak awal abad ke-21, China berusaha meningkatkan citranya sebagai kekuatan global baru melalui transformasi politik luar negeri. Untuk
memperluas ruang politik, China tidak hanya menggunakan diplomasi periferi namun juga strategi diplomasi lintas regional melalui mekanisme
bilateral dan multilateral. Dalam konteks ini, penulis melihat pada isu spesifik yaitu pembentukan AIIB sebagai bukti partisipasi China dalam
politik ekonomi global. AIIB dapat dilihat sebagai praktik multilateralisme politik luar negeri China sebagai upaya memenuhi tantangan
pembangunan domestik, regional, maupun global. Dalam hal ini pembentukan AIIB tidak hanya berimplikasi pada kebijakan perdagangan
dan keuangan China, tetapi juga pada penyelesaian kesenjangan infrastruktur di Asia sekaligus menantang pengaruh Amerika Serikat (dan
Jepang) melalui Bank Pembangunan Asia (ADB), yang mana China memiliki kekuatan politik minor untuk mengakomodasi kepentingan
politik ekonominya.
Kata kunci: China, revisionis, status quo, kontestasi multilateralisme, AIIB.
Abstract
This article seeks to understand China’s foreign policy today by assessing its leadership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
using the scholarly term of ‘contested multilateralism’ coined by Julia Morse and Robert Keohane. We argue that since the beginning of the
21st century, China has managed to improve its image as a new global power through the transformation of its foreign policy. In expanding
its political sphere, China is using not only peripheral diplomacy but also cross-regional diplomacy strategies through the existing bilateral
and multilateral mechanisms. Within this context, we look at a specific case of the AIIB creation as evidence of China’s greater participation
in the global political economy realm. The AIIB can be seen as how China practices multilateralism in its foreign policy as it is trying to meet
domestic, regional, as well as global development and economic challenges. This article argues that the creation of AIIB is not only the
implication of China’s fiscal and trade policy, nor merely to solve the regional infrastructure gap in Asia, but also to challenge the US (and
Japan) influence through the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in which China possesses minor political power to accommodate its political
economic interests.
Keywords: China, revisionist, status quo, contested multilateralism, the AIIB.
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cially the failure of China to win a seat in the United Na-
tions (UN) and the Korean War, in which China has expe-
rienced substantial losses from the Allied attack on the
Korean Peninsula. This had been followed by vicissitudes
in the relations between China and the Soviet Union as
well as the United States (US), while China tried to ba-
lance itself against the two superpowers and aligned with
the Third World.
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The transformation of China’s foreign policy started
not so long after Deng Xiaoping liberalized the Chinese
economy at the end of the 1970s. During the initial stages
of economic reform, eastern coastal provinces were opened
to foreign investment to accelerate development. As mo-
dernization became the key driving force of China’s eco-
nomic development, the relations with Western countries
had been very significant. China had been able to utilize
the relations to support economic reform. The result had
been outstanding. For example, China achieved an im-
pressive average Gross National Product (GNP) growth rate
of nine percent from 1978 to 1993 (Hishida, 1994). Mas-
sive industrialization has succeeded in boosting China’s
economy, enabling Beijing to increase outward foreign
direct investment in order to prevent fiscal stagnation in
the domestic sphere. This significant development, among
others, raises a question whether the rise of China would
become a threat to regional stability in the near future
(Saeki, 1995).
In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), China
ranks number two in the world after the US (or number
three if the European Union is viewed as a ‘country’).
Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders are reluctant to call their
country as one of the developed industrializing countries.
Rather, they see China as the leader of the developing coun-
tries—President Xi Jinping himself stated this in 2014 (Fish,
2014). Given the mixed and confusing status, where China
can be considered as neither developed nor developing
countries, China is expanding its political sphere using
both peripheral diplomacy and cross-regional diplomacy
strategies through the existing bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms (Lanteigne, 2009).
Peripheral diplomacy means that China seeks to en-
gage with its neighboring countries (East Asia, Southeast
Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia) in various forms of
cooperation, including economic, socio-cultural, and po-
litical-security cooperation. This approach was initiated by
Jiang Zemin with several underlying reasons. First, it pro-
vides certainty to neighboring countries that the
Tiananmen incident will not bring China back to the poli-
tics of isolation. Second, it prevents the collective coop-
eration efforts of neighboring countries affiliated with the
US to impede Chinese rule in Asia, by involving these
countries into China’s regional interests. Third, it con-
vinces neighboring countries that China is not present to
dominate but to be an alternative partner in the Pacific
region. Ultimately, it aims to maintain external political
stability to develop domestic economic and market reforms.
It is also a part of Jiang’s ambition, namely ‘daguo waijiao’
or ‘great power diplomacy,’ aimed at improving economic,
military, and geopolitical capabilities in the region
(Lanteigne, 2009).
Meanwhile, cross-regional diplomacy aiming to coop-
erate with countries from other regions, such as Africa,
Latin America, and Europe, broadens China’s interna-
tional cooperation. To date, the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) is a sort of concrete vision initiated by China, which
membership includes numbers of countries from differ-
ent regions. This outstanding economic scheme involves
six economic corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia, China-
Central Asia-West Asia, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar,
New Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Pakistan, and Indochina
Peninsula. Delivering his speech during the 2017 BRI Sum-
mit in Beijing, Xi Jinping clearly addressed that the pur-
poses of reviving ancient Silk Road (land and maritime)
included deepening policy connectivity, enhancing infra-
structure connectivity, increasing trade connectivity, ex-
panding financial connectivity, and strengthening people-
to-people connectivity. Remarkably, the preliminary con-
cept of BRI was firstly introduced in Kazakhstan and In-
donesia in the autumn of 2013.
Initiated under the Hu Jintao administration, cross-
regional diplomacy focuses to counter anti-Chinese poli-
cies by the US and to strengthen strategic cooperation with
the European countries creating a multipolar global con-
stellation. Furthermore, it aims to demonstrate a good
intention to the neighboring countries in order to create a
harmonious atmosphere for economic growth. At this
point, Hu’s objective is to create a new global constella-
tion based on multipolarity. Based on these two levels of
engagement, the pattern of China’s diplomacy has flour-
ished through different channels and at various levels (Lam,
2006).
Given the multiple channels of China’s international
diplomacy, multilateralism has become one of the major
approaches in China’s foreign policy practices since the
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era of Jiang Zemin. In addition to bilateral relations, China
has been pursuing regional and multilateral forums to pro-
mote its national interest; among the notable achievements
is when China was granted membership of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Since then, China
has been widely seen as possessing active foreign policy, in
contrast with Deng’s call for China to ‘hide capabilities
and be low profile’ in its foreign relations.
Notably, China has recently upgraded its approach to
multilateralism through the creation of the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016. Some acknow-
ledge the establishment of the AIIB as a multilateral fi-
nancial institution is as China’s first initiative of its kind.
Others argue that AIIB may lead to the restructuring of
global economic governance, in which the status quo,
American-led global economic governance regime, will be
challenged. In her article, Paola Subacchi strongly argues
that despite China’s contribution to filling Asia’s large
infrastructure gap through the AIIB, it would cause a more
fragmented regional economic governance where two com-
peting institutions, the AIIB and the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), presenting ‘a risk of establishing divergent
investment standards’ (Subacchi, 2017).
In fact, this phenomenon has lured attention from both
academia and policymakers regarding the driving factors
behind the creation of AIIB. Since the mid-twentieth cen-
tury until today, the global economic governance has been
dominated by the Bretton Woods system, whereby the US
and Britain stand as the primary actors behind the scene.
The subsequent formation of International Monetary Fund
(IMF) as the international financial institution, World
Bank as the international development institution, and
WTO as the international trade institution have streng-
thened the main principle of Bretton Woods system.
Rather than utilizing the existing international institution
such as ADB, China came up with a new institution signi-
fying controversy (China with other four countries of
BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa—had actu-
ally established New Development Bank (NDB) prior to
AIIB. But, perhaps due to its limit of scope and funding,
NDB is not as controversial as AIIB). To put it simply: why
does China create a new international development insti-
tution rather than utilizing the existing body?
Against this backdrop, this study seeks to learn the
political motives of China behind the creation of the AIIB.
It is significant for two main reasons. First, it provides a
detailed explanation of why China created the AIIB. Sec-
ond, it helps develop the debate on China’s foreign policy
scholarship. The study mainly argues that the initiative of
China to create the AIIB is not merely to strengthen its
fiscal and trade policy. Instead, China aims to challenge
the existing US-led global economic governance regime,
which is being exercised through the ADB as the exten-
sion of the World Bank in Asia. Within this context, it is
interesting to explore the argument using the concept of
contested multilateralism.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
WHY ‘CONTESTED MULTILATERALISM’?
Studying the politics of multilateralism in International
Relations (IR) remains pertinent to understand the coop-
eration between states and non-states actors. Comparable
to bilateralism and imperial hierarchy, multilateralism is
an alternative concept of how global politics should be
organized (Caporaso, 1992). As ‘an architectural form,’
multilateralism contains ‘deep organizing principle of in-
ternational life’ (Ruggie, 1992). It does not only take ac-
count the importance of divisibility, but also considers the
generalized principles of conduct and diffused reciproci-
ty. In this sense, multilateralism is regarded in a traditional
perspective, which merely defines it as the cooperative
“practice of coordinating national policies in groups of
three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by
means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990: 731). It is also a
specific platform to understand how different interest of
states are converged and transformed into a set of institu-
tion consisting norms, principles, and rules, whose objec-
tives are to reduce the costs of transactions and to provide
relevant information (Keohane, 1984).
In the light of scholarly debates on multilateralism in
IR, Julia Morse and Robert Keohane coined a concept of
‘contested multilateralism.’ They argue that states, inter-
governmental organizations, and other non-state actors
often act strategically, using alternative multilateral orga-
nizations to pursue their interests when established insti-
tutions fail to do so. They perceived that when a group of
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states is dissatisfied with existing institutions, they would
respond in mainly two approaches. First, they will seek to
shift the focus of rulemaking to other institution, which is
properly defined as ‘regime shifting.’ Second, they con-
struct an alternative institution, which is labeled as ‘com-
petitive regime creation.’
The conceivable effect of such approaches is an institu-
tional change in the configuration of multilateral institu-
tions, mostly leading to, or expanding and reinforcing,
regime complexes as opposed to integrated international
regimes. Rather than looking at the element of coopera-
tion within a multilateral institution, dissatisfaction against
rules, practices, or missions of existing multilateral institu-
tions become the core of how contested multilateralism
plausibly occurs, thus bringing competition among multi-
lateral institutions. The competition will end up in two
possible results: the newly created institution will provide
criticism against the existing institution, thus making an
influence for institutional reform; or when one succeeds,
the others fail.
Whether the disagreed coalitions, in terms of regime
shifting or competitive regime creation, would successfully
contest the existing multilateral institutions, the power of
states remains central. Contested multilateralism is likely
to be a success if states possess abundant resources and
institutional advantage. Powerful states have incentives to
act multilaterally, “both to mobilize support and attendant
resources, and to gain legitimacy for their contestation of
established multilateral policy” (Morse & Keohane, 2014:
388). Interestingly, even if an unsatisfied coalition consist-
ing of weak states are unable to force immediate change,
they are still able to challenge existing institutional prac-
tices symbolically. In general, contested multilateralism
emphasizes on what kind of multilateralism that is “best
to achieve long-term objectives,” with the unavoidable con-
sequence of regime complexity (Morse & Keohane, 2014:
389).
Although we found contested multilateralism useful,
some scholars have debated the concept. Stewart Patrick,
for example, argued that the disagreement against the prac-
tice of existing institution would only stimulate the grow-
ing number of informal multilateral cooperation. He pre-
fers to use ‘multilateralism à la carte’ rather than contested
multilateralism as he found that this situation produces
flexibility, informality, and piecemeal governance (Patrick,
2015a). In his other work, Patrick argues that this “ad hoc-
ism, if carried too far, could undermine formal institu-
tions whose legitimacy, resources, and technical capacity
are needed over the long haul and cannot be easily re-
placed” (Patrick, 2015b: 127). Gráinne de Búrca criticized
contested multilateralism as it signifies a way to challenge
or undermine the existing institutions, rather than advanc-
ing the objectives and practices or supplementing and en-
hancing them (de Búrca, 2016). However, we understand
that despite the disagreement towards contested multila-
teralism, it can be used to learn the ongoing debate on
China’s foreign policy scholarship, which is on revisionist
or status quo power.
Much related to the concept of contested multilate-
ralism, the rise of China into the center of global and re-
gional economic governance raises a question whether
China will be a ‘revisionist’ or ‘status quo’ power against
the US-led global governance. Some argue that China will
never go beyond the current structure of global politics,
let alone aligning its interests to the existing structure.
Alastair Johnston puts an argument that it is difficult to
determine whether China is a revisionist or status quo state,
suggesting that China is “more integrated into and more
cooperative within international institutions than ever
before” (Johnston, 2003: 5). In contrast, although perceiv-
ing that China’s foreign policy has been increasingly ac-
tive, Mitsuru Kitano understands that nationalism and
domestic revitalization have pushed a stronger foreign
policy, with which China will maintain status quo if it
deals with the US and demonstrates revisionist propen-
sity in the regions where the US has minor interest. This
middle approach signifies that China would not be a revi-
sionist as long as American hegemony remains (Kitano,
2011).
On the other hand, there are arguments that China
will be a revisionist power to challenge the dominance of
the US in global politics. Thomas Christensen highlights
that China’s baseline realpolitik view of international poli-
tics serves as the core of its foreign policy, where China’s
elites are suspicious of many multilateral organizations, not
only those devoted to the issue of economy and environ-
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ment but also in non-proliferation and regional security
issues (Christensen, 1996). Although China participates
in the existing international institutions, it is merely for
representation and respect to the other states as well as to
ensure that cooperation will not hinder its objectives. Then,
still emphasizing the revisionist stance of China, Feng
Huiyun perceives that a set of operational code beliefs and
strategic norms from Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang
Zemin, and Hu Jintao shape China’s foreign behavior to
become a revisionist state (Huiyun, 2009).
Within this sense, the term ‘revisionist’ is similarly re-
lated to what Morse and Keohane define as ‘regime shift-
ing’ and ‘competitive regime creation,’ in which dissatis-
fied coalition seeks to move to other existing institutions
or to establish a new competing multilateral institution to
challenge the goals, norms, organization, and principles
of the previous institution. It signifies that a particular
state, mostly new rising power, is not willing to align itself
to the norms and practices of the existing multilateral in-
stitution, thus seeking a way to find another set of norms
and practices. In short, the term ‘revisionist,’ ‘competitive
regime creation,’ and ‘regime shifting’ share some impor-
tant key points, including dissatisfaction, political disso-
nance, alternative, and change. It is good to note, how-
ever, that the term also possesses broader meaning and
scope.
Thereupon, in this article, we challenge the prior pers-
pective, argue that China’s ‘competitive regime creation’
approach is a logical consequence of its fiscal, and trade
policy. However, as the term ‘competitive regime creation’
shares similar key points with the term ‘revisionist,’ we
contend that China to a great extent will be viewed as a
‘revisionist’ state as it demonstrates essential efforts to
change or to find the alternative from what is already avail-
able. In short, ‘revisionist’ implies an end, while ‘competi-
tive regime creation’ signifies a means. The AIIB then is a
means for China to play greater role in global politics as it
challenges US domination. However, given the fact that
China is still a member of the World Bank and ADB, it is
being a status quo power is also justified.
RESULT AND ANALYSES
WHY CHINA ESTABLISHED THE AIIB
The AIIB is the first multilateral financial institution
created by China and immediately welcomed by many
countries. The AIIB aims to fund the investment gap in
Asia approximately USD 800 million per year until 2020.
Compared to the World Bank and the ADB, this bank is a
medium-sized one. The capital base of the World Bank
and the ADB is more than USD 250 billion and USD
150 billion, respectively, whereas that of the AIIB is around
USD 100 billion (Callaghan & Hubbard, 2016).
The initiative to establish a new multilateral bank was
officially proposed by President Xi Jinping before the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Bali on October
2, 2013. Five formal consultation meetings took place since
then. Twenty-four Asian countries welcomed the initia-
tive by signing a memorandum of understanding on Oc-
tober 24, 2014. Within the same month, a discussion as to
how the voting shares would be decided has concluded a
proposal agreed by the founding countries based on Pur-
chasing Power Parity and GDP, as well as regions: Asia or
non-Asia. According to the proposal, Asian members hold
75 percent of the total voting shares, with non-Asian mem-
bers holding 25 percent (Weaver, 2015). As of October
2017, there are 58 members, with various voting share
among them, and 22 prospective members of the AIIB
(AIIB, 2017).
The US had a diplomatic defeat after it failed to dis-
suade its closest allies (excluding Japan) from joining the
AIIB. It is worth examining whether the AIIB will be
China’s tool to pursue its interests or to write new rules
for international trade. The latter is what the US has been
anticipating. Interestingly, US allies welcomed China’s
initiative in the AIIB as shown from their integration to
the bank. The United Kingdom, for example, disregarded
the US pleas to not becoming a member of the AIIB and
then joining the bank in March 2015. The United
Kingdom’s step was followed by Australia, New Zealand,
South Korea, and Germany. The then US Treasury Secre-
tary Lawrence Summers stated that the US has “lost its
role as the underwriter of the global economic system,”
and the failure of the US to persuade its allies to stay out
from the AIIB has been a diplomatic triumph for China
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(Summers, 2015). The membership of AIIB is also marked
with the integration of the South American and African
countries. A non-sovereign state like Taiwan is even allowed
to join AIIB, thus making this multilateral institution dif-
ferent from the ADB and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
Why did China establish the AIIB? Daniel Chow of-
fers three reasons to answer this question. First, the exist-
ing Western-led institutions (the Bretton Woods system,
i.e., World Bank, IMF, and ADB) do not provide much
space to act for emerging economies like China. Even
though China is the world’s second-largest economy, it
lacks significant roles in these Western-led institutions. The
voting power of China in the World Bank, IMF, and ADB
are 4.61 percent, 6.09 percent, and 5.477 percent, respec-
tively. In the ADB, Japan has more than twice (12.80 per-
cent) of China’s vote share, while the US has 12.752 per-
cent. These numbers make China a minor player in these
institutions, making it possesses less space to maneuver in
global political economy. Second, China wants to play a
bigger role in infrastructure development in Asia, which
approximately amounts over USD 8 trillion for the next
ten years since it was established. The existing multilateral
financial institutions are seen as incapable to supply this
fund where the AIIB acts as a complementary. Third, the
AIIB is China’s direct response to the US tendency to con-
tain it from becoming a great power. US failed attempt of
persuading other countries to not joining AIIB only makes
China extend the membership of AIIB to many more coun-
tries, showing to the US that it is already a great, ‘friendly’
power (Chow, 2016).
Despite being only in its initial years, many have ap-
plauded the AIIB as an alternative multilateral financial
institution that will play an important role in regional eco-
nomic development. Xing Yuqing, for example, contends
that there are at least four benefits that China may gain
from the AIIB, so prompting for its establishment. First,
the AIIB is considered as a platform for China to pave
new channels for its Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA) both bilaterally and multilaterally. According to the
White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, from 2010 to 2012
approximately USD 14.4 billion has been given to devel-
oping countries in the form of bilateral ODA. While in-
vestigators criticized China’s ODA as creating interdepen-
dence with the country, through the AIIB, the receiving
states would be unlikely to have political strings attached
to the donor states. This is because the assistance is chan-
neled through the respective institution, not directly from
a state—in this case, China.
Second, the establishment of the AIIB is thought as a
part of China’s fiscal policy as it has been progressing ra-
pidly in economic development. Infrastructures such as
railways, roads, and types of machinery have been mas-
sively built to lubricate the economic activities. As the con-
sequence, productivity increased significantly to feed the
needs of the domestic market, even to the point where
China can export on a large scale. Not only productivity
increased, but China has also successfully hit USD 10 tril-
lion in GDP, making it the world’s second-largest economy.
With an additional USD 3.2 trillion of foreign reserves
and surpluses, China has an abundant amount of capital
being accumulated. However, the progressive economic
situation had to end up with stagnation. China’s economy
is reported to have been facing sluggishness as the capital
accumulated has been circulating within, yet the develop-
ment of infrastructure has already reached its peak. To put
it in a simple way, China has nowhere to invest their capi-
tal. Therefore, this argument goes to say that the AIIB is a
way for China to utilize the capital to invest abroad. Not
only it serves the purpose of helping low-income coun-
tries, but it also keeps the capital flow run smoothly.
Third, creating the AIIB is also considered beneficial
for China’s trade. The new arising challenges on global
trade governance from the new emerging powers in trade
governance, represented by the ‘New Quad’ like Brazil,
India, China, which have never become the part of tradi-
tional ‘Old Quad’ represented by mainstream Western bloc
(composed of the European countries, the US, Australia,
Canada, and Japan) is evident. These new bloc represents
countries from ‘Global South’ which has brought about
their growing relevance in global trade governance, mani-
festing their ‘large and growing trade shares,’ ‘concerted
activism’ in the organization, ‘growing presence in key
decision-making fora’ inside and outside the WTO, and
inclusiveness in the organization (Narlikar, 2010).
The AIIB will help China to reduce constraints due to
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deterioration of its exports in the global market, especially
in the wake of the global financial crisis. China’s export
declined sharply from 20 percent in 2008 to -2.8 percent
seven years later. To overcome this, China is trying to fill
the infrastructure development gap in Asia through the
AIIB. As the AIIB serves to provide loan for infrastruc-
tures improvement in the developing countries, this indi-
rectly helps China promote its exports, too, because of the
enhanced accessibility. In the end, China would be able to
improve connectivity with other countries, including cre-
ating initiatives for transportation and communication to
promote economic cooperation. These would be very ben-
eficial to sustain the economic growth of China’s trading
partners. China would understandably benefit from this
situation: when the income of these countries rises, they
will likely to open new markets for Chinese manufactur-
ing products. As China needs to find other markets for its
products, the AIIB could garner the potential markets for
China’s exports.
Alternatively, the AIIB will also provide China with a
better opportunity in promoting its One Belt, One Road
(OBOR, now Belt and Road Initiatives, BRI) strategy with
its regional partners. It is evident that three major Chi-
nese investors, namely China Development Bank (CDB),
China Communication Construction Company (CCCC),
and China International Trust Investment Corporation
(CITIC) are backing up the grand projects of BRI. That
said, AIIB would not only serve China’s financial support
but also function as a platform to negotiate and connect
with the concerned countries. It is projected that from
this situation, the AIIB will open a new pathway for China
to gain more significant influence, steering regional coop-
eration by spearheading integrations of the member states
(Yuqing, 2016).
Of all the reasons scholars propose on this issue, one
cannot escape from the argument that China established
the AIIB because it wanted to have a greater say in regional
economic governance. While it may be true that China
has benefited much from its involvement in World Bank,
IMF, and ADB, but its minor position in those three insti-
tutions has prevented it from having more influence. This
is demonstrated partially with the share of the vote China
has in the ADB, such as compared to those of Japan and
the US, a Japanese always become the ADB President, mak-
ing this bank to become a Japan-dominated institution.
On the other hand, in the World Bank, the US holds the
only veto power over decisions by the bank. High officials
in the IMF and the World Bank are mostly from the mem-
bers holding the largest quotas in which China is not a
part of, including the US, Japan, Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom. These prove how the space available
to China in these two institutions is limited so that it may
be led to the creation of the AIIB. China’s veto power over
decisions in the AIIB is larger than its power in the ADB
and the World Bank.
Therefore, there is a growing understanding that the
ADB has been perceived as a rival for the AIIB, or rather
the other way around. When Japan has been staying longer
in the field with its ADB, China comes to the battlefield
with their newly led AIIB. ADB president, Takehiko Nakao
would find his counterpart, or perhaps ‘rival,’ on then
Chinese Finance Minister Jin Liqun, who was elected as
the President of AIIB with a five-year official term. The
competition of regional leadership between Japan and
China is inevitable, particularly presented by both multi-
lateral development banks. The timing of the establish-
ment has risen the argument on how China’s motivation
in establishing AIIB is no other than the means to chal-
lenge Japan’s leadership on financial assistance in Asia.
THE AIIB: CONTESTED MULTILATERALISM AND REVISIONIST-
STATUS QUO STATE
One may argue that China’s ambitious trajectory is
driven by its desire to be an influential state not only re-
gionally, but also globally. In addition to strengthening its
soft power, China’s pursuit of hard power is depicted
through, among others, challenging the US dollar in the
global economy. As Renminbi is now included in the Spe-
cial Drawing Rights basket, meaning that it is recognized
as one of the major currencies accepted for international
exchange, China also encourages its banks to provide more
lending to companies as well as governments. China is
advancing the AIIB operation to support its objective to
acquire more economic power.
Those who watch China closely are understandably
familiar with this argument: as China possesses much more
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economic and military power, it shall be regarded and re-
spected as a great power. China wants to escape from the
daunting images of ‘the age of humiliation’ and rebuild
its position as an influential center of power. This has been
true in post-Deng Xiaoping foreign policy, in which Chi-
nese leaders have promoted various ideas and strategies,
from Jiang Zemin’s ‘responsible great power’ until Xi
Jinping’s ‘new type of great power relations.’ ‘Hide your
capabilities and be low profile,’ as Deng used to call to
Chinese diplomats, is considered as no longer relevant.
This only prompted Western countries to accuse China of
becoming ‘free-rider’: it enjoys many benefits from the in-
ternational order without properly conducting its obliga-
tions. China counters this by arguing that the US has al-
ways been containing it to become a responsible great
power. The establishment of the AIIB can, therefore, be
put within this context. In the words of Jeffrey Bader,
former Director of the John L. Thornton China Centre,
“There was thus a developing consensus, inside and out-
side China, that China should play a much larger role in
the international system as a rule-writer and operator”
(Bader, 2016: 5).
Playing a greater role internationally ‘as a rule-writer
and operator’ is evident in the case of China’s leadership
in the AIIB. China does not want to be in ‘the passenger
seat of global governance’ anymore (Legault, 2015). Realiz-
ing that it is very hard to acquire a larger share of the vote
in the World Bank, IMF, and especially ADB, China seeks
to create an alternative multilateral financial institution.
In the AIIB China would possess large power, as it is the
main source of the bank’s capital and hold the veto rights.
Providing most of the capital does not necessarily make
China the dominant shareholder. Nonetheless, China
persistently claimed that they are only a part of the primus
inter pares member. However, the fact that China’s leader-
ship in the AIIB is more influential than in the ADB can-
not be denied (Wang, 2016).
The establishment of the AIIB had been enabled by
the size of China’s economic power, which in turn will
serve it with the largest share of vote in the bank’s opera-
tion. This is simply an example of ‘competitive regime cre-
ation’ as argued by Morse and Keohane. The AIIB is set
up as China wants to contest US and Japan leadership in
the multilateral financial institution. Herewith, China is
implementing contested multilateralism. Its abundant re-
sources of economic power and institutional advantage
would encourage the likely success of the AIIB.
Creating a competitive institution to the Western-led
ones, China can be seen as starting revisionist stance in
international politics. Nevertheless, it is too early to argue
that China would step up its revisionist stance by creating
another alternative multilateral institution. The AIIB is
soon entering the beginning of its third year of existence,
and many have to be done to make it a success story of
China’s multilateralism initiative. One needs to compre-
hend the short and long-term capability of the AIIB to
serve China’s primary goal, i.e., becoming a great power
that can influence the international order.
Interestingly, China does not want to quit those multi-
lateral financial institutions it challenged with the setting
up of the AIIB. China is still a member of the World Bank,
the IMF, and the ADB. This fact underlines a very impor-
tant principle of Chinese foreign policy, i.e. creating and
strengthening favorable conditions and conducive environ-
ment to promote China’s economic development. With
regard to this situation, one could simply say that China is
actually still a status quo power.
We understand that the AIIB demonstrate a unique
position in China in terms of power at the international
level. China is not happy with its share of influence in the
existing multilateral financial institutions that it set up a
new one (‘revisionist’), but it is still a member of those
institutions as it does not want to lose all benefits it has
enjoyed (‘status quo’). With regard to the AIIB, China is
departing from being a ‘free-rider’ or sitting in ‘the pas-
senger seat,’ but it will not embrace revisionist stance in
full speed. The Beijing-based AIIB is an example of con-
tested multilateralism—a means China can use to build its
international image, to boost economic development, and
to achieve its goal of becoming a great power—all of which
revisionist and status quo would complement to each other.
CONCLUSION
This article understands that the creation of AIIB is
about not only the implication of China’s fiscal and trade
policy or the initiative to solve the regional infrastructure
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gap in Asia, but also to challenge the power of the US as
well as Japan. It may be the main reason of the AIIB estab-
lishment, as China seeks to possess major influence to
accommodate its growing political economy interests. Not
only will the AIIB serve President Xi’s goal of China hav-
ing similar great-power status with that of the US, it is also
a ‘further proof of the rebalancing of the world economy,’
as suggested by Pierre Gramegna, Luxembourg’s minister
of finance (Wong, 2016). In this sense, although China is
not paving a way to be a full revisionist state, the way it
contributes and involves in regional economic governance
will always pose a serious concern of its domination in the
global politics.
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